Juan Diaz, Jr. v. Director Federal Bureau of Pri by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-20-2017 
Juan Diaz, Jr. v. Director Federal Bureau of Pri 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Juan Diaz, Jr. v. Director Federal Bureau of Pri" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 1103. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/1103 
This November is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4676 
___________ 
  
JUAN DIAZ, JR., 
                    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS;  
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS;  
REGIONAL DIRECTOR; WARDEN LEWISBURG USP;  
ASSISTANT WARDEN LEWISBURG USP; CAPTAIN LEWISBURG USP;  
LIEUTENANT LEWISBURG USP; L. POTTER, EMT-P 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-12-cv-02519) 
District Court Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2017 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 20, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Juan Diaz, Jr., a prisoner, assaulted a prison guard as the two were walking down 
the hall.1  Diaz was tackled and restrained and then moved to a holding cell, where he 
spat on the guard he had assaulted.  Diaz also spat on another guard.  Thereafter, a use of 
force team carried Diaz to another area of the prison and placed him face down in four-
point restraints.  Diaz complained that one restraint was too tight, and it was immediately 
loosened.  Diaz remained in four-point restraints for twenty-four hours.  He was then 
placed in ambulatory restraints—which are much less restrictive and allow an inmate to 
eat, drink, and use the bathroom without staff intervention—for another twenty hours.  
The undisputed record evidence shows that, pursuant to Department of Corrections 
Policy, Diaz’s restraints were checked every fifteen minutes for the entire time that he 
was restrained.  He was offered routine opportunities to drink water, eat meals, and use 
the restroom.  Nevertheless, Diaz remained defiant and combative, cursing staff and 
threatening to harm them and again harm the guard he initially assaulted.  Once Diaz 
regained his composure, he was released from the ambulatory restraints.  
 Diaz filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2  Diaz claimed that Defendant Whitaker, 
who supervised the use of force team and oversaw Diaz’s placement in the four-point 
restraints, maliciously and wantonly inflicted unnecessary pain when he ordered Diaz 
placed in the restraints.  He claimed that, during the hours he was restrained, Defendant 
                                              
1 According to Diaz, he was upset that the guard had “lied on him” during a disciplinary 
proceeding earlier that day.  Although Diaz’s opening brief seeks to downplay his 
aggressive behavior, he told prison staff shortly after the attack that he “went crazy on 
[the guard]” for lying in the proceeding. 
2 Although his second amended complaint named numerous prison officials, Diaz 
voluntarily dismissed all but four Defendants from the case.   
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Whitaker ignored his continuous complaints that the restraints were too tight, which 
caused a “new medical issue.”  In addition, Diaz claimed that Defendant Whitaker and 
Defendant Potter, the attending emergency medical technician, were deliberately 
indifferent to his needs for life’s necessities—including food, water, and use of the 
restroom—and to his serious medical needs—i.e. the injuries caused by the overtight 
restraints. 
 The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, supported with declarations 
from Defendants Whitaker and Potter, the medical records kept while Diaz was 
restrained, and the logs kept by the guards and medical staff documenting the fifteen 
minute checks and Diaz’s combative behavior—evidence that clearly rebutted Diaz’s 
claims that the Defendants acted maliciously and were deliberately indifferent to his 
needs.  Diaz filed arguments opposing the motion, but he offered no evidence 
whatsoever—in the form of an affidavit or a declaration, for example—to support the 
allegations in his complaint.3  The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment.  Diaz timely appealed.    
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review of the 
District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  See Caprio v. Bell Atl. Sickness & 
Accident Plan, 374 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2004).  We will affirm.4 
                                              
3 Diaz did claim that video evidence, which the Defendants submitted to the District 
Court, supported his claims.  However, we have reviewed that evidence.  It does not 
support Diaz’s allegations. 
4 To the extent that Diaz has raised new claims—that the Defendants violated his rights 
under the Fourth Amendment and prison regulations regarding the material from which 
the restraints were constructed—he asserted them for the first time on appeal; hence, we 
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 The District Court correctly granted summary judgment on Diaz’s cruel and 
unusual punishment claim.  “[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”  Whitley 
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (alteration in original, quotation marks omitted).  
Whether this standard has been met “ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a 
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the 
very purpose of causing harm.”  Id. at 320-21 (quotation marks omitted); see also Wilkins 
v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010); Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 328 (3d Cir. 2009).  In 
the context of restraints, like the four-point and ambulatory restraints used to confine 
Diaz, “the Supreme Court in Hope [v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)] identified 
particular criteria relevant to the use of excessive force test.”  Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 
172, 180 (3d Cir. 2015).  Hope held that (1) where the inmate had “already been subdued, 
handcuffed, [and] placed in leg irons,” and (2) there was a “clear lack of an emergency 
situation” such that “[a]ny safety concerns had long since abated,” then (3) subjecting the 
inmate to “substantial risk of physical harm” and “unnecessary pain” serves no 
penological justification.  536 U.S. at 738. 
The record contains no evidence that Defendants acted maliciously or sadistically 
in administering Diaz’s four-point restraints.  The record evidence on this point makes 
clear that Diaz was behaving violently and was placed in restraints—for his protection 
and the protection of the staff—after he rammed his shoulder into one guard, and then 
                                                                                                                                                  
decline to address those claims here.  Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 
1994) (“This court has consistently held that it will not consider issues that are raised for 
the first time on appeal.”). 
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spat in his face, and then spat in the face of another, all in spite of the guards’ attempts to 
calm him.  Cf. Young, 801 F.3d at 181 (“[Young] was not violent, combative, or self-
destructive at any point leading up to his prolonged confinement in the restraint chair.”).  
Unlike Hope, where the prisoner had been subdued and shackled and later transported 
from a worksite back to the prison before he was handcuffed to a “hitching post,” this 
was not a case where “[a]ny safety concerns had long since abated.”  Hope, 536 U.S. at 
738.   
The record evidence is also clear that prison officials required Diaz to stay in four-
point restraints for twenty-four hours because he remained combative, defiant, and 
uncooperative with staff.  During this period, staff checked on Diaz every fifteen minutes, 
and at nearly every interval he defiantly cursed at them, and on several occasions 
threatened them, saying “I will kill you,” “you will see what I can do,” and “you just 
wait.”  He also threatened to harm the guard he had initially assaulted, warning staff to 
tell “that [guard] just wait.”  The evidence further shows that even after staff moved Diaz 
from four-point restraints to much-less-restrictive ambulatory restraints, he remained 
combative for another twenty hours; however, once Diaz became less combative and 
regained his composure the ambulatory restraints were removed.  Accordingly, no 
reasonable factfinder could conclude the Defendants acted maliciously or sadistically or 
for the purpose of causing harm, as Diaz claimed.   
 Similarly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants 
Whitaker and Potter on Diaz’s deliberate indifference claims.  Diaz’s complaint can be 
read as asserting that Defendants Whitaker and Potter were deliberately indifferent in 
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denying him the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities—like food, water, and the 
ability to use the restroom—for the twenty-four hours he spent in the four-point 
restraints.  See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 335 (3d Cir. 2016).  Diaz’s complaint 
can also be read as claiming that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his 
serious medical needs—i.e. the injuries he claims were caused by the restraints.  See id. 
at 337.   
 “A prison official is deliberately indifferent if the official ‘knows that [the] 
inmate[] face[s] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to 
take reasonable measures to abate it.’”  Id. at 335 (quoting Chavariagga v. N. J. Dep’t of 
Corrs., 806 F.3d 210, 229 (3d Cir. 2015)).  Here, however, there is no evidence in the 
summary judgment record that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent.  Defendant 
Whitaker provided evidence that prison officials checked on Diaz every fifteen minutes; 
he was offered water every two hours and opportunities to eat a bagged lunch at every 
meal time; he was also offered the opportunity to use the restroom every two hours; and 
that Diaz did not complain that his restraints were too tight, and any such complaint 
would have been referred to medical professionals.  Likewise, Defendant Potter 
submitted evidence that Diaz rejected multiple offers to use the restroom or to drink 
water.  The Defendants’ evidence matches the prison’s records, which reflect that 
medical staff encouraged Diaz to drink water, offered him opportunities to use the 
bathroom, and routinely checked Diaz’s restraints, but that on several occasions Diaz 
refused any restraint checks.  While Diaz has made various allegations about the 
Defendants’ purported misconduct, he has not produced any evidence to survive 
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summary judgment.  See Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“In this respect, summary judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut up’ time for the 
non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record 
and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral 
argument.”).  This record would not permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that either 
Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Diaz’s needs. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.5  In reaching our 
decision, we have reviewed the evidence Diaz seeks to introduce on appeal.  Because that 
evidence does not alter our conclusion, we treat his motion to “amend an exhibit to his 
complaint” as a motion to supplement the record, and we deny it.6 
                                              
5 Diaz does not challenge on appeal the District Court’s ruling on his First Amendment 
claim, and this we will not address it here.  See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 
190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002). 
6 We also deny Diaz’s request to strike Appellees’ brief. 
